PATTERNS OF DEMOBILIZATION: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (QCA) OF FAR-RIGHT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGNS[*]

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Scholarship on social movement lifecycles has focused on mobilization processes, with relatively less attention on the ends, demobilization. The intuitive connection between origins and ends has sometimes led to a conceptualization of demobilization as simply the failure to continue mobilizing, obscuring the distinct causal processes underlying demobilization. This article adds to recent studies foregrounding demobilization by studying the negative demobilization of large, far-right, demonstration campaigns. Using a subset from this population of cases—campaigns in Germany, England, and Austria between 1990 and 2015—the article applies qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to this causally complex phenomenon. I find that demobilizing is conjunctural, with evidence of four patterns: closing opportunity, coercive state repression, civil countermobilization, and militant anti-far-right action. This article addresses an important—and conspicuously ubiquitous—population of cases, far-right demonstration campaigns and presents findings that reflect on critical issues in the study of far-right sociopolitics.

Social movement mobilization processes have received much scholarly attention, demobilization processes comparatively little. The obvious connection between these concepts—even the parallelism of the terms, "mobilization" and "demobilization"—can encourage conceptualizations of demobilization as a failure to mobilize. Yet it is a truth borne out repeatedly in empirical observation: the endings of movement campaigns, organizations, fields do not simply mirror their beginnings. Demobilization occurs through distinct causal processes—not merely a failure to mobilize.

Notwithstanding the relative paucity of research, demobilization is covered in several recent studies. At the microlevel of individual participation in movement activity, research from Fillieule (2009, 2015) and from Gorski and Chen (2015) delve into individual disengagement and activist burnout. To date, Davenport (2015) offers the most thoroughgoing theorization of organizational demobilization—albeit one marked in some parts by induction from a single case study. Others (e.g., Heaney and Rojas 2011; Lasnier 2017) have examined the demobilization of whole movements or movement fields. In the areas of terrorism research (e.g., Cronin 2009) and studies on repression, too, demobilization is covered, but often in an inescapably particularistic manner: terrorism is skewed toward the circumstances of armed contention against the state, excluding more common forms of movement activity; and repression, too often treated solely as the province of the state (see Earl 2006), encompasses only one grouping of external demobilizing pressures.

Yet one form of demobilization is especially underexamined, that of *campaigns*. The scarcity of research on campaign demobilization is surprising; part of the mesolevel of analysis, campaigns are the crux of movement activity (Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009; Tilly 2004: 4), but little research has focused on the ending of this activity. This article adds to research filling this lacuna

(Demirel-Pegg 2015, 2017; Zeller 2021) by examining the negative demobilization of a subset of demonstration campaigns. The article applies qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to this causally complex phenomenon. It provides a model for further cross-case study sorely needed in social movement research, which is saturated with case studies that provide rich empirical data but scant capacity for generalization. Moreover, by examining large, far-right, demonstration campaigns, the article addresses an important—and conspicuously ubiquitous—population of cases, and presents findings that reflect on key issues in the study of far-right sociopolitics.

The article proceeds as follows: the next section puts forward a theorization of social movement campaign demobilization and applies that theory to the population of large, far-right, demonstration campaigns. A subset of this population, from Germany, England, and Austria between 1990 and 2015, provides the empirics for the study. The article reviews the data and methods employed, giving particular attention to the collection of protest event data, how this is used to form a dataset of campaigns (consisting of series of protest events), and how QCA is an especially suitable analytical tool. The article proceeds to the QCA analysis and parses the meaning of the results to reveal four patterns of demobilization that can be termed (1) closing opportunity, (2) coercive state repression, (3) civil countermobilization, and (4) militant anti-far-right action. It concludes by discussing several tentative conclusions and lines for further research.

THE POPULATION OF LARGE, FAR-RIGHT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGNS

Broadly, demobilization is the process whereby social movement activity—of whole fields, of organizations and activists, or of particular campaigns—decreases and ultimately ends. Note that this overarching conception encompasses decline (a processual phenomenon) and cessation (a discrete outcome). Davenport (2015: 22) provides a crucial distinction in his theorization of organizational demobilization, between positive and negative demobilization. The former denotes demobilization resulting from "winning," a perceived success of activity; the latter, "collapse, implosion, hindrance, or explosion." In other words, there are three discrete sets that cover the universe of potential developments of movement campaigns: (1) non-demobilization (i.e., continued mobilization), (2) positive demobilization, and (3) negative demobilization. This last form, unintended, undesired demobilization is the focus of the present article. In set-theoretic terms, therefore, the outcome of interest is negative demobilization whereas the non-outcome (i.e., not negative demobilization) encompasses both non-demobilization and positive demobilization.

Scholars have conceptualized demobilization at macro- (e.g., Tarrow 2011: 190) and micro-levels (e.g., Fillieule 2015: 278). The intermediate, mesolevel of analysis has received less attention. Davenport (2015) offers a valuable study and theorization of organizational demobilization. But the demobilization of campaigns remains an understudied part of the mesolevel of analysis. Social movement campaigns consist of four essential elements: (1) a constant organizing actor (typically a movement organization, either solely or in coordination with others), (2) temporal boundedness, (3) strategically linked actions (i.e., a series of events), and (4) the intention to advance movement goals (Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009).

Campaigns are how movements move, but how that motion stops or changes direction remains unclear. Existing scholarship addresses campaign demobilization somewhat obliquely. Theorization on protest policing is especially noteworthy: Della Porta and Reiter (1998: 4) list some of the central variables within protest policing phenomena. Yet study in this area seldom focuses on demobilization per se—often it is the underexamined outcome of what research sometimes casts as a monocausal process. Koopmans's (1997) insightful study teases out aspects of protest policing, drawing a crucial distinction between situational and institutional repression—but it is situated at the macrolevel wherein policing and repression have an effect on society-wide levels of mobilization. For all their merits, such studies obscure demobilization processes and tend to fall into the trap of framing demobilization as the inverse of mobilization, rather than a separate set of phenomena characterized by different causal processes.

Earl's (2006) conceptualization of social control is more suitable to study of demobilization. Earl (2004, 2006) differentiates social control along three dimensions

1. Identity of repressive agent: (a) state agents closely connected to national political elites (i.e., national state agents); (b) state agents distantly connected to national political elites (i.e., local state agents); (c) private agents.
2. Character of repressive action: (a) coercion—direct repression; the threat or use of force; (b) channelling—indirect repression (e.g., resource deprivation, problem depletion).
3. Visibility: (a) overt/manifest—observed, explicit, obvious repressive action; (b) covert/latent—unobserved, concealed, veiled repressive action.

This conception provides two significant advantages. First, it moves away from the exclusive focus on repressive action by the state to include manifestations of social control from private (i.e., nonstate) agents. These too can exert demobilizing pressure. Second, Earl's conceptualization provides for the conjunctural nature of demobilization: whether one form of social control—say, overt coercion from local state agents—materialises does not exclude any other—such as latent channelling from private agents. Indeed, inspecting cases of campaign demobilization reveals that, rather than monocausal and linear patterns, demobilizing factors typically manifest in combinations. Conjunctions of causal factors produce the outcome of demobilization.[1]

Extant research focused on campaign demobilization bears out this causal nature. Demirel-Pegg (2015) provides case studies of protest campaign demobilization, both developing causal mechanisms of demobilization processes: by "brutal and indiscriminate repression" and by "critical events" that alter the strategic opportunities available to campaign organizers (2017). In both cases, the main causal factor represents only the most crucial in a conjunction of conditions. Zeller (2021) identifies a causal mechanism of coercive countermobilization triggering state social control and producing demobilization. These studies provide depth and rich analysis—but, like all single case studies, have limited potential for generalizable inference.

Other research is less useful, if only for its glancing attention to demobilization. For instance, in an otherwise illuminating article, which recognizes the conjunctural quality of campaign outcomes, Huang and Sun (2019: 419) give very short shrift to protest campaign failure. In their analysis of contentious campaigns, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) only inspect failed cases as a way of enhancing their analysis of successful ones. This is typical of much research, eschewing analysis of failure and demobilization in favor of mobilization and success. Thus, existing research reveals little consideration of campaign demobilization and (the perennial problem in social movement studies) a general dearth of cross-case study.

Large, Far-Right, Demonstration Campaigns

Attempting to derive a general theory of campaign demobilization would be misguided; campaigns are too varied in their form and surrounding context, and the process by which campaigns demobilize are too multitudinous.[2] Given the impossibility of a general model of campaign demobilization, the goal of scholarship in this area should be to examine subsets from that vast universe of cases. These subsets should, first, explicitly represent specific populations in themselves so that findings about demobilization processes (from within-case studies) and patterns (from cross-case studies) are set in a meaningful empirical constellation. Second, subsets ideally would offer connections to other, similar populations; rather than being particularistic, findings should relate to other cases of demobilization processes.

This study examines a subset that satisfies these criteria: large, far-right, demonstration campaigns. Demonstrations[3] are, as King and Soule (2007: 415) assert, the "quintessential tactic" of social movements. That whole campaigns consist of series of demonstrations is not surprising. They serve several important purposes for movement organizations: raising awareness, attracting new members, keeping existing members connected, promoting group solidarity, and facilitating networking. Beyond such instrumental ends, demonstrations provide meaningful references to

past events, preceding mobilizations within social movements, and can fulfill other symbolic functions. They are exhibitions of movement strength and the centerpiece of the contentious repertoire in modern society (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 2008). As such, demonstration campaigns are a meaningful—though still overlarge—subset of campaigns to study demobilization processes.

Demonstration campaigns are particularly common and particularly important within the far-right movement field. Almost certainly, demonstrations serve all or most of the instrumental purposes listed above, but for the far right, symbolic motivations are perhaps even more significant. Marching down the main thoroughfare of a city or town, or convening a large rally harks back to the far right's "glorious past": the fascist regimes of the interwar years and their mass displays of martial pomp. By demonstrating far-right movements boldly claim their space in the public sphere, unwilling to accept—as most far-right movements had to after the Second World War—a more furtive existence. As a result, there is typically not much internal pressure to abandon demonstration campaigns. Far-right demonstration campaigns have a common property of inertia: not tending to stop or change unless acted on by an outside force. For these reasons, far-right demonstration campaigns are particularly suitable to examine causal processes related to external demobilizing factors, both affording opportunities of generalizing to other populations and representing in itself an important population of cases.

"Large" is an ancillary scope condition that reinforces the focus on external demobilizing factors. Larger campaigns attract more attention from other actors, including from the state (Biggs 2018; McCarthy, Mcphail, and Smith 1996). The threshold of what constitutes a large demonstration is vague. This study refers to a mobilization of at least 1000 participants at the zenith of a campaign, which is a threshold that is often recognized (e.g., Huang and Sun 2019; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996), but the qualitative distinction is certainly not that clear. In any case, because of the relationship between demonstration campaign size and the attention garnered, it is likely that there is a qualitative difference between the demobilization of large and smaller demonstration campaigns.

In this subset of cases, negative demobilization takes on one of two clear manifestations. First, a demonstration campaign ceases its demonstrations. If the previously regular demonstrations no longer occur, the campaign has demobilized. Second, demonstration campaigns live and die by the participants mobilized for the event; in some respects, it does just come down to numbers (Biggs 2018; Denardo 1985). So when a demonstration campaign experiences decreased participation, it undergoes a degree of negative demobilization—all the more so when the decrease is large and sustained over successive demonstrations.

DATA AND METHODS

Cases of large, far-right, demonstration campaigns were drawn from three countries, Germany, England,[4] and Austria, between 1990 and 2015. Far-right demonstration campaigns are strikingly ubiquitous; they mobilize and manoeuvre in most societies that are sufficiently liberal. Indeed, general openness for mobilization, a minimally permissive opportunity structure, is necessary for far-right movement organizations to emerge. Liberal societies' tolerations and rights succour demonstrations of many doctrinal stripes. Unsurprisingly, then, the liberal societies of Europe are commonly distinguished by the presence of boisterous and sometimes potent far-right movements and their demonstration campaigns. Together, within the broader grouping of European liberal democracies, the geographic bounds of Germany, England, and Austria represent an illuminating cross-section of contexts: on the bases of far-right party and movement sector strength, Michael Minkenberg (2013a) distinguishes these countries by strong parties and weak movements (Austria), weak parties and moderately strong movements (western Germany), and weak parties and strong movements (eastern Germany[5] and the United Kingdom, see table 1). Furthermore, the development of specific instruments to address far-right activism and demonstrations (Germany and Austria), and the absence thereof (England) varies the presence of forms of state social control. This reduces methodological problems that stem from limited diversity.

Table 1. Country Contexts of Demonstration Campaigns.

		Far-Right Movement Strength		
		Low	*Medium*	*High*
Far-Right Party Strength	*Strong*	**Austria** [a]		
	Weak		**Germany (west)** [a]	**Germany (east)** [a] England

[a] The country contexts in bold typeface have specific legal instruments to address far-right activism and demonstrations. Adapted from Minkenberg (2013a: 12).

The temporal bounds of 1990 and 2015 delimit an important and particularly energetic period of far-right activity. A rising tide of far-right mobilization in the public sphere followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As Minkenberg (2013b: 12) writes, "the notion that the mobilization of the radical right or xenophobic movements often occurs in times of accelerated social and cultural change provides a fruitful starting point for explaining relevant trends both in Eastern Europe after 1989 and in Western Europe before and after that momentous year." The spur of changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with renewed far-right mobilization in many European countries—not least in Germany, after the reunification of East and West.

Similarly, the end of 2015 coincided with a shift of far-right activism in Europe. The following year, 2016, saw the far right celebrate the results of the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union and, in the United States, the election of Donald Trump.[6] More specifically, 2016 marked a clear shift in England, where the government used powers of the Terrorism Act of 2000 to ban a far-right organization (the so-called "National Action" group) for the first time since the Second World War. In Germany, large inward migration peaked in the refugee crisis of 2015; politicized to a phenomenal degree, it prompted a wave of far-right demonstrations and other forms of mobilization. This wave largely subsided—apart from the persistent campaign of PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, or Patriotic Euro-peans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) in Dresden—as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party radicalized and provided an electoral voice for far-right grievances. Austria, too, was gripped by politicized immigration issues in 2015; the governing coalition of centrist parties was troubled by internal strife and decreasing popularity, the start of a development that yielded the 2017 government of a more conservative center-right party in coalition with the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ).

Drawing from these three countries yields a set of thirty-two cases of large, far-right, demonstration campaigns (see figure 1 and appendix 1). The method of fuzzy-set QCA (see below) enables a meaningful analysis of this midrange number of cases. But it also demands detailed empirical knowledge of each case—no mean feat—in order to perform the iterative process, the "back and forth between ideas and evidence" that is essential to qualitative research (Ragin 2008: 78). The campaigns vary considerably in length and number of participants (above the threshold of mobilizing more than 1000 people at least once), but they all represent far-right movement campaigns consisting of series of demonstrations.

Protest Event Data to Campaign Dataset

Demonstration campaigns are a unit of analysis composed of several protest events, so assembling these data began with the creation of a protest event dataset (PED).[7] A search for large, far-right demonstrations in the specified countries and period was undertaken. This search provided the basis for targeted data collection on associated events: demonstrations by the same far-right organizer(s). The project adopted a "blanketing strategy" (Hutter 2014) for this data collection: information on events was drawn from multiple sources, chiefly police and state security agency records, as well as local and national newspaper coverage, and information from involved social movement actors. In all, this yielded a PED of nearly 500 manually coded demon-stration events.

Figure 1. Timeline of Demonstration Campaign Cases in Descending Order of Size

Note: * denotes campaign initiation before the period of interest, ** denotes campaign continuation beyond period of study (i.e., past 2015), *** denotes campaign initiation before and continuation after the period of interest.

PED was grouped into campaign data based on continuity of organizing actor and topical focus.[8] In some instances, the resultant campaigns manifest in annual demonstrations in the same (or nearby) locations; in others, more temporally condensed campaigns focusing on some pressing topic or development. Most campaigns (twenty-five of thirty-two) occurred in Germany, where far-right organization and mobilization has long been exceptionally robust; three of the four cases from Austria[9] are initiatives of far-right fraternities (*Burschenschaften*), while the other is a commemoration of World War II soldiers (a form mirrored in several campaigns in Germany); and in England, where the far-right scene is typically smaller and more fractious, campaigns were organized by the British National Party (BNP) and the English Defence League (EDL).

Campaign Data in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

Research in various areas of social movement studies indicate several distinct causal characteristics of demobilization. First, demobilization results from *conjunctural causation* (Schneider and Wagemann 2012); it is the product of a causal process of combined conditions. Second, demobilization is *equifinal* (ibid.); that is, there are multiple pathways to demobilization, multiple demobilizing processes. Third, demobilization processes are *asymmetrical* (ibid.), meaning that the absence of conditions leading to the outcome may not lead to the absence of the outcome. Furthermore, this implies *multifinality* (ibid.): causal conditions of demobilization, such as forms of social control, may be causally relevant for demobilization and non-demobilization. (The inconsistent effects of repression—by turns, deterring and inciting movement activism— epitomises multifinality.) In other words, demobilization is characterized by causal complexity.

Set-theoretic methods are well suited to these ontological notions of causality; and QCA provides a means of cross-case study of causally complex phenomena. This study employs fuzzy-

set QCA (fsQCA),[10] which allow the cases' membership in sets to be partial (i.e., representing degrees of the concept of interest), to incorporate dimensions of time into the study—avoiding temporally flattening out campaign data. As explained below, the rationale for this is that causal conditions will only exert causal force when they are proximate to the case outcome and (to a lesser extent) when they manifest repeatedly.

In this study, the outcome of interest is *negative demobilization* (ND). Calibrating this set, in line with the aforementioned definition of negative demobilization, consists of a composite of two sets: (1) observation or not (i.e., crisp set) of ceased demonstration events where the organizing actor has not had some demand or raison(s) d'être satisfied (which would signify positive demobilization); (2) observation of decreased demonstration size in a campaign (i.e., fuzzy set) over repeated events. Given the importance of sheer participation numbers to demonstration campaigns, large and sustained decreases in demonstrator numbers represents a degree of negative demobilization. Like asserting 1000 participants constitutes "large" for campaigns, the threshold for negative demobilization by participatory decline is somewhat arbitrary. Yet if a campaign that once mobilized more than 1000 participants now mobilizes fewer than 100 participants in successive events, it is fair to say this fully represents the concept of negative demobilization (i.e., full set membership, 1). If fewer than 200 participants (but more than 100), then this partially represents negative demobilization (i.e., 0.67 set membership). If fewer than 500 participants (but more than 200), then this somewhat represents negative demobilization (i.e., 0.33 set membership). And if participation does not drop below 500, then it is not justified to speak of participation-based negative demobilization. As ever with fuzzy sets, the qualitative anchor of 0.5 divides between cases that represent the concept, even if imperfectly (> 0.5), and cases that do not represent the concept, even if traces of it manifest (< 0.5). Within the composite outcome set, cessation of demonstration events takes precedence; if demonstrations have ceased, whether participation has decreased is irrelevant. In absence of that distinct negative demobilization, decreased participation may qualify. Demonstration campaigns in which events continued past 2015 were coded as non-negative demobilization.

Four conditions (summarized in table 2, next page) are derived from Earl's conceptualization of social control with the intention of isolating different forms of counteraction from different agents. Each of these conditions exact a causal force most when they are, chiefly, proximate to the outcome and, secondarily, repeated. These characteristics allow for the fuzzification of the four social control conditions with the direct assignment method of calibration: proximate and repeated observable manifestations represent full set membership (1); proximate but not repeated observable manifestations, more in than out (0.67); repeated but not proximate observable manifestations, more out than in (0.33); and no or only isolated observable manifestations that are not proximate to the outcome (0). The four-value set is "especially useful in situations where researchers have a substantial amount of information about cases, but the nature of the evidence is not identical across cases" (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 90).

State channelling social control (SCH) refers to measures by state actors that restrict the operation of the demonstration campaign but stop short of invoking the state's coercive apparatus to prohibit demonstrations.[11] SCH may include banning certain locations or speakers for the campaign, bans on organizations involved in the demonstration campaign, and new laws (national, regional, or local) that diminish the organizer's opportunity for action—state actions that do not preclude demonstration events per se but do encumber them.

State coercion social control (SCO) denotes use of the state's coercive powers or threat of violence: banning demonstration events, arrest and detention of numerous demonstrators.[12] SCO is typically legally ordered or permitted police enforcement or prevention measures.

Private channelling social control (PCH) refers to nonstate[13] (i.e., the initiative of private actors) actions that restrict the operation of the demonstration campaign, but without resorting to coercive measures. PCH often takes the form of simultaneous counterdemonstrations that seek to meet the demonstrative power of the far-right campaign with a countervailing public presence, or to undermine the attention-seeking far-right demonstration with a larger, more appealing event, as well as disruptive tactics, such as when counterdemonstrators play loud, boisterous, discordant

music during a far-right group's solemn memorial march. PCH also includes private agents making legal challenges or lobbying for legal changes; these efforts likewise attempt to deprive far-right campaigns of resources or opportunities essential to their demonstrations.

Private coercion social control (PCO) denotes the presence of nonstate coercive action: private violence or threat of violence. PCO of course includes instances where private agents violently engage far-right demonstrators; but it also covers instances where they blockade far-right march routes or demonstration venues: this too constitutes a physical confrontation intended to prevent a far-right demonstration.

In addition to those four conditions, the QCA model includes a temporal condition. *Long duration* (LD) refers to demonstration campaigns lasting for ten or more events (i.e., a crisp set). (Three events is considered minimum to constitute a demonstration campaign; up to nine events are arguably midrange campaigns. This threshold was checked with robustness tests, which revealed that minor alterations to this threshold did not significantly affect the QCA results.) Unlike the other causal conditions, which existing theory suggests should contribute to negative demobilization, long duration is more ambiguous. Far-right campaigns may grow and thrive as long continuation begets senses of tradition and ritual. Annual gatherings and commemorations are very much in this mold. Yet long duration may also constitute a demobilizing pressure, especially when campaign events are rapidly recurrent, demanding significant personal investment from activists. Thus, whereas the four preceding conditions have positive directional expectations, long duration cannot be expected to contribute to negative demobilization or non-negative demobilization.

Table 2. Calibration Summary of Conditions and Outcome.

| Set Label	Abbr.	Set Scores and Empirical Manifestation
State Channelling	SCH	0 - zero or only one observation of SCH that is not proximate to outcome
		0.33 - repeated observations of SCH but not proximate to outcome
		0.67 - one observation of SCH that is proximate to outcome
		1 - repeated and proximate to outcome observations of SCH
State Coercion	SCO	0 - zero or only one observation of SCO that is not proximate to outcome
		0.33 - repeated observations of SCO but not proximate to outcome
		0.67 - one observation of SCO that is proximate to outcome
		1 - repeated and proximate to outcome observations of SCO
Private Channelling	PCH	0 - zero or only one observation of PCH that is not proximate to outcome
		0.33 - repeated observations of PCH but not proximate to outcome
		0.67 - one observation of PCH that is proximate to outcome
		1 - repeated and proximate to outcome observations of PCH
Private Coercion	PCO	0 - zero or only one observation of PCO that is not proximate to outcome
		0.33 - repeated observations of PCO but not proximate to outcome
		0.67 - one observation of PCO that is proximate to outcome
		1 - repeated and proximate to outcome observations of PCO
Long Duration	LD	0 - campaign lasting fewer than 10 events
		1 - campaign lasting 10 or more events
Negative Demobilization (Outcome)	ND	0 - no observations of negative demobilization (continued mobilization or positive demobilization)
		0.33 - somewhat diminished participation in demonstration campaign, fewer than 500 participants (but more than 200) at events
		0.67 - significantly diminished participation in demonstration campaign, fewer than 200 participants (but more than 100) at events
		1 - observation of ceased demonstration events (without observations of positive demobilization) or nearly total lost participation (i.e., fewer than 1000 participants at demonstration events)

QCA RESULTS

Analysis of Necessity

Following recommended QCA best practice, this study conducted a test of necessity prior to analysis of sufficiency (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 278). First, each condition was tested. No single condition proved necessary for the outcome of negative demobilization, which is consistent with most theorization on demobilization. Then, a test for necessity of disjunctions (i.e., of combinations of conditions) was conducted. One should also note that disjunctions "tend to be big sets in which most (and sometimes all) cases are members" (Schneider 2018: 248). In other words, disjunctions may not actually be necessary—just exceedingly common. Researchers should therefore attend to the Relevance of Necessity (RoN) measure.

The disjunction of state coercion *or* private channelling (denoted as: SCO + PCH) passes the common consistency threshold of 0.9 with a score of 0.927; the RoN is 0.594, which is passable. The necessity of this disjunction is plausible: private channelling against a far-right campaign *or* state coercion could be needed to bring about negative demobilization. However, plotting this disjunction (figure 2) facilitates a closer inspection of the supposed necessity relation. The plot gives lie to the necessity of state coercion *or* private channelling: more than half of all inconsistent cases (i.e., the second Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Ulrichsberg-Gedenkfeier campaigns) are *deviant cases for consistency in kind*, which directly contradict the statement of necessity (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013; Schneider 2018: 247). Thus, no atomic conditions, nor any disjunctions of conditions are necessary for the outcome of negative demobilization.

Figure 2. Necessity Plot of SCO + PCH.

Analysis of Sufficiency

In QCA truth tables are the central analytic tool. They allow "researchers to visualise and analyse central features of causal complexity, such as equifinality or conjunctural causation and the presence of INUS or SUIN conditions" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 9). In a truth table (table 3 on the next page), each column denotes a different set (either causal condition or outcome); "each row denotes a *qualitatively different* combination of conditions, [that is], the difference between cases in different rows is a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 92, emphasis in original). The truth table is sorted by outcome

Table 3. QCA Truth Table.

	SCH	SCO	PCH	PCO	LD	OUT	n	Incl	PRI	Cases
8	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	1.000	1.000	BNP Red, White and Blue festival; Trauermarsch Dresden, Wiener Korporations Ball
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	2. Waffen-SS commemoration; Heidenau hoert zu
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	2. Wehrmachtsausstellung
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Lichtellaeufen Schneeberg
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Sachsentag (Sommerfest)
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	1. Waffen-SS commemoration
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Ulrichsberg-Gedenkfeier
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	HoGeSa
22	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Pressefest der Deutsche Stimme
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	AN Antikriegstag
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Bad Nenndorf Trauermarschen
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	1. Hess Gedenksmarsch
29	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	2. Hess Gedenksmarsch
7	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	0.876	0.859	Fest der Voelker; Magdeburg Bombing Commemoration; Mourn Lee Rigby
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	7	0.556	0.530	Deutsche Volksunion Congress; PEGIDA Dresden; Legida; Linzer Burschenbundball; Mittenwald Gebirgsjaeger Pentecost; EDL rally; Freital steht auf
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.248	0.248	1. Wehrmachtsausstellung
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.198	0.000	Freigeist; REP Aschermittwochsveranstaltung
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.000	0.000	Tag der deutschen Zukunft; Wien Akademiker Ball
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	Einsiedel sagt Nein
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-	
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-	
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-	
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-	
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-	
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-	
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-	
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-	

(OUT) and inclusion (Incl.). The nonsequential row numbers in the first column reflect the basic ordering of the configurations, from no present conditions (i.e., row 1 consists only of zeroes) to all conditions present (i.e., row 32 consists of all ones. See Dusa 2019). Furthermore, PRI means "proportional reduction in inconsistency" and indicates relevance, that is, "how much it [analytically] helps to know that a given X is specifically a subset of Y and not a subset of ~Y" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 242).

This sorting shows which rows (or combinations of conditions) co-occur with the outcome and how consistently; inclusion, in other words, shows how some rows, like row six, contains cases that have and do not have the outcome. Empirical cases can be represented by one—and

only one—row, or combination of conditions. This is true for cases with fuzzy set membership, too, because the qualitative anchor of 0.5 separates set members and nonmembers: a case with 0.67 membership in a set falls into a truth table row where that set is present (1); a case with 0.33 membership, into a row where the set is absent (0). Thus, the campaign cases are sorted into the rows that reflect conditions in their case: the n column records the number of cases in each row; the cases column lists them. Rows that represent an unobserved combination of conditions have no cases in them (i.e., the bottom thirteen rows); the outcome is uncertain (thus, the OUT column records a "?") in such instances because there are no empirical observations.[14]

Take note of row six, which is clearly below the raw consistency threshold: that is, within this row there are cases that are part of the outcome set (i.e., Deutsche Volksunion Congress, Legida, EDL rally, and Freital steht auf) and cases that are nonmembers of the outcome set (i.e., PEGIDA Dresden, the Linzer Burschenbundball, and the Mittenwald Gebirgsjäger Pentecost). Given the high degree of inconsistency, this row is excluded from the logical minimisation process (i.e., the derivation of a sufficiency solution) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 121–22).

To produce an intermediate sufficiency solution[15] from the truth table, the study applies the "directional expectations" (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 168–74) about the causal influence of conditions in the model. (Recall from above, each form of social control is expected to contribute to demobilization processes; "long duration" is ambiguous, suggesting no directional expectation.) Boolean minimization of the truth table yields four configurations of conditions that generate negative demobilization:

$$SCH * LD + SCO * {\sim} LD + PCH * {\sim} LD + {\sim} SCO * PCO * LD => ND$$

This mathematical representation reads as follows: state channelling (SCH) *and* long duration (LD) *or* state coercion (SCO) *and* not long duration (~LD) *or* private channelling (PCH) *and* not long duration (~LD) *or* not state coercion (~SCO) *and* private coercion (PCO) *and* long duration (LD) are sufficient to produce negative demobilization. Each of the four solution terms, separated by the logical OR (denoted by a "+"), represents a sufficient configuration of conditions. Table 4 displays the coverage[16] and consistency[17] of the terms within the solution, as well as the cases covered by each term. Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of the solution for negative demobilization. Figure 4. presents a plot of this solution.

Table 4. Intermediate Sufficiency Solution to Negative Demobilization (Unique cases bolded)

| Solution term	Higher-Order Concept	Coverage	Consistency	Typical cases
SCH*LD	closing opportunity	0.145	0.910	**Pressefest der Deutsche Stimme**; Bad Nenndorf Trauermarschen
SCO*~LD	coercive state repression	0.247	1.000	**1. Hess Gedenksmarsch; Sachsentag (Sommerfest); 1. Waffen-SS commemoration**; Heidenau hört zu; 2. Hess Gedenksmarsch; 2. Waffen-SS commemoration
PCH*~LD	civil counter-mobilization	0.363	0.962	**AN Antikriegstag; Fest der Voelker; HoGeSa; Lichtellaeufen Schneeberg; Mourn Lee Rigby**; 2. Hess Gedenksmarsch; 2. Waffen-SS commemoration; Heidenau hört zu
~SCO*PCO*LD	militant anti-far-right action	0.232	1.000	**BNP Red, White and Blue festival; Trauermarsch Dresden; Wiener Korporations Ball; 2. Wehrmachsausstellung**; Bad Nenndorf Trauermarschen
[Solution]		0.840	0.967	

Figure 3. Graphic Illustration of the Solution for Negative Demobilization.

Legend: ✱ Logical AND   - - - - - Conjunction of INUS conditions

   ✚ Logical OR   ———— Conceptual relations   ⟶ Sufficient configuration of conditions

The first configuration consists of state channeling and long enduring campaigns (SCH*LD). It is suggestive of a well-known phenomenon in social movement studies: *closing opportunity*. Basically, state authorities alter the legal strictures on demonstrations or affect the availability of resources for performing demonstrations. The cases fitting within this configuration seem to bear out this interpretation. In the Ulrichsberg-Gedenkfeier[18] case in Austria, which honored soldiers killed in the Second World War (most prominently and controversially including Wehrmacht and SS soldiers), the state withdrew the army's participation in the event along with the support of some other resources; participation numbers for the event shrank to no more than a couple hundred by 2015. The Pressefest der Deutsche Stimme, a press junket for the newspaper of the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), negatively demobilized in the aftermath of revelations about terrorist acts by the so-called National Socialist Underground, whereupon several German states enacted measures (including several organizational bans [Zeller 2020]) that limited the mobilizing capacity of far-right groups and activists. (Admittedly, though, the Pressefest demanded a lot of resources and mobilizing energy, so internal movement pressures may be more important than external pressures.) The Bad Nenndorf Trauermarsch campaign similarly evinces this causal configuration, though there is an issue of overdetermination since it is also covered by another solution term (~SCO*PCO*LD). Within-case study could disentangle these conditions and assess what truly had a causal effect.

State coercion and a not-long enduring campaign (SCO*~LD) comprise the second sufficient term in the solution. This configuration seemingly accounts for *coercive state repression*: bans and prohibitions, arrests, and prosecutions. For instance, in the case of the first Waffen-SS commemoration campaign (in Halbe, Germany in the early 1990s), negative demobilization occurred when local state authorities imposed a ban on the events and there was mass police deployment to prevent any attempt by the far right to demonstrate. The INUS[19] condition "not of long duration" (~LD) in this term is intriguing. Partially, it is an artefact of limited diversity: only one truth table row representing both state coercion social control and long duration (i.e., SCO*LD) fits any case (row twelve and the first anti-Wehrmachtsausstellung campaign), meaning there is no empirical evidence for the seven other rows representing this conjunction. This could suggest that state authorities do not commonly apply coercion to large, far-right, demonstration campaigns that are longstanding, and/or that coercion against such longstanding campaigns is not effective in causing negative demobilization.

The third solution term denotes private channelling and not-long enduring campaigns (PCH*~LD). This essentially amounts to civil countermobilization. Inspecting the cases covered by this term, several are marked by the presence of other causal conditions that seem relevant to

Figure 4. Sufficiency Solution[a]

Sufficiency relation

Inclusion: 0.967   Coverage: 0.840   PRI: 0.965

Note: [a] Cases at point 1 are fully covered and consistent with the solution formula. The cases at point 2 are individually irrelevant cases (IIR). Importantly, the deviant cases for coverage (Legida, Deutsche Volksunion Congress, EDL rally, and Freital steht auf) are intriguing cases for further study because they are not covered by the solution formula. Within-case study could uncover the causal conditions that explain negative demobilization in those campaigns.

the negative demobilization outcome. For instance, the second Hess Gedenkmarsch campaign, which occurred in the first half of the 2000s and honored the memory of Rudolf Hess, a prominent Nazi leader, negatively demobilized only after a new law criminalized glorification of the Nazi regime (Virchow 2013). The law was certainly spurred on by private channelling efforts, wherein residents from the location of the far-right campaign (Wunsiedel, Germany) lobbied national politicians to adopt a prohibition against "Nazi glorification" (the "*NS Verherrlichung stoppen*" campaign)—but other causal conditions (i.e., state channelling social control) were significant. The combination of private channelling and not-long enduring campaigns may, therefore, signify a causal trigger, which can spark several different negative demobilization processes.

The fourth solution term is composed of no state coercion, private coercion, and long duration (~SCO*PCO*LD). Here, we see the application of physical confrontation, threatened or realized, by nonstate agents against the far-right campaign. It is the *militant anti-far-right action* pattern of negative demobilization. The cases covered all display the violence or "violence-ready" (*gewaltbereit*) tactics of groups like Antifa and Autonomists, typified by blockades of far-right demonstration sites and disruption of events by attacking police and/or far-right activists.

DISCUSSION

Taken together, the QCA results suggest several conclusions—but the provisionality of these conclusions should be underscored at the outset. In all its myriad forms, demobilization is a process. Longstanding assertions (e.g., Tarrow 2011) and recent studies (e.g., Demirel-Pegg 2015,

2017) in social movement scholarship hold that causal mechanisms underlie demobilization processes. Inevitably, even mechanisms of the same type take on unique forms in each case, but this fact should not lead us into notions of inescapable idiosyncrasy nor, by the same token, deter searches for cross-case findings. With QCA, we can suss out meaningful causal patterns, but we cannot thence confirm causal mechanisms. Follow-on process tracing—cases selected in the manner prescribed by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013, 2016)—is essential to valid causal inference.

With that caveat in mind, the QCA results and re-examination of the analysed demonstration campaigns point to some important findings. Each form of social control can affect negative demobilization. That no causal condition is necessary nor solely sufficient reinforces the view of demobilization processes as multifarious. It also supports presuppositions about demobilization's causal nature: it is conjunctural, occurring through the coming together of conditions

In several cases covered by different solution terms, it appears that private agents acted first—even if subsequent state action was causally decisive. For example, the first Hess Gedenkmarsch campaign (in Germany) is covered by the *coercive state repression* term (SCO*~LD), but within this case coercive countermobilization by antifascist and autonomist activists was crucial in triggering state action (Zeller 2021). In the Ulrichsberg-Gedenkfeier campaign (in Austria), the QCA results suggest state channelling, *closing opportunity*, was decisive. Yet a clutch of counter-demonstrators (organized in the *Arbeitskreis gegen den kärntner Konsens*, or "Working Group against the Carinthian Consensus") had begun to protest against this event years before the national government forbade the Austrian army's participation and before the government withdrew subsidies for transporting older would-be demonstrators up a mountain to the event location. Whether due to inattention, indifference, or (particularly in cases where local state authorities oppose the far-right campaign) insufficient capacity, it appears that sometimes private forms of social control must first materialize to jolt the requisite state actor(s) out of lethargy or spur on the requisite state action.

The results also confirm the effectiveness of coercive repression. Such a mild claim is scarcely contestable. The QCA results, nevertheless, bear out this assertion and, going further, suggest that both *coercive state repression* and *militant anti-far-right action* can bring about negative demobilization. But inspecting the cases covered by the latter pathway reveals that brawling, bashing, and "punching a fascist" is perhaps not what is needed. In the private actions against the British National Party's Red, White and Blue festival, the Dresden Memorial March (*Trauermarsch*), the Bad Nenndorf Memorial March, violent clashes with the far-right demonstrators or police were marginal, while blockades of march routes and event venues were tactically central. To be sure, the far right (to whatever extent the possibility of violence represented a concern and not a welcome invitation to fight) and police in these cases were well aware of militant anti-far-right activists' potential for violence; perhaps that, being menacing to a certain degree, was the crucial characteristic, if not to prompt state action, at least to deter faint-hearted far-right would-be demonstrators. The cases covered by the fourth solution term suggest this might be so.

Lastly, the distribution of cases from different countries across the four solution terms is revealing. German cases are covered in all the terms, but English cases are covered only in the civil countermobilization (PCH*~LD) and militant anti-far-right action (~SCO*PCO*LD) terms; the sole Austrian case of negative demobilization is also covered by the militant anti-far-right action (~SCO*PCO*LD) term. In part, this clustering is a consequence of limited diversity: there are only two English cases (the Mourn Lee Rigby and BNP Red, White and Blue festival campaigns) and one Austrian case (the Wiener Korporations Ball campaign) with the full out-come. Nevertheless, this clustering meets expectations about the demobilization processes in these contexts. Neither in Austria nor in England was any state social control present. In Austria, this is attributable to far-right party strength (see table 1): the FPÖ was a driving force behind the Wiener Korporations Ball campaign, indeed sponsoring a successor campaign (the Wien Akademiker Ball campaign). In England, the absence of state social control may be due to the lack of specific legal instruments to deal with far-right activism or, relatedly, the state's relatively noninterventionist

posture toward far-right demonstrations. Within-case studies of the English and Austrian cases could shed more light on the nature of state (in)activity in these instances.

Each of these provisional conclusions demands greater scrutiny, to verify and further specify pathways and to identify causal mechanisms. More cross-case study could assess whether these findings hold in other populations. This should form part of the continued development of demobilization research. In particular, coincidence analysis (CNA, another set-theoretic method) could be used to reveal cross-case sequencing patterns; further ethnographic study (e.g., Pilkington 2016) is sorely needed to assess micro-effects of some causal conditions, such as how individual activists experience and react to forms of social control. This article's QCA contributes to the important research agenda on demobilization.

APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF CASES

Campaign name	Location(s)	Far-right SMO(s)	Years
AN Antikriegstag	Dortmund	Autonome Nationalisten	2005-2013
Bad Nenndorf Trauermarschen	Bad Nenndorf	NPD and several smaller groups	2006-2015
Deutsche Volksunion Congress	Passau	DVU	1987-2001
PEGIDA Dresden	Dresden	Pegida (Dresden)	2014-
Fest der Völker	Jena, Altenburg	NPD	2005-2010
Freigeist	Sachsen	NPD	2015-2015
1. Wehrmachtsausstellung	Several German cities	NPD and several smaller groups	1997-1999
2. Wehrmachtsausstellung	Several German cities	NPD and several smaller groups	2001-2004
1. Hess Gedenksmarsch	Wunsiedel, nearby towns	Coalition of far-right groups, led by far-right activists including Michael Köhnen, Christian Worch, and Jürgen Rieger	1988-1994
2. Hess Gedenksmarsch	Wunsiedel	Jürgen Rieger's Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland and other far-right groups	2001-2004
HoGeSa	Köln, Hannover, Ludwigshafen	Hooligans gegen Salafisten (HoGeSa), Gemeinschafts-Stark Deutschland eV	2014-2015
Legida	Leipzig	Legida	2015-2016
Lichtelläufen Schneeberg	Schneeberg	NPD (Sachsen)	2013-2014
Linzer Burschenbundball	Linz	Burschenschaft Arminia Czernowitz zu Linz	1948-
Magdeburg Bombing Commemoration	Magdeburg	NPD and associated groups	2005-2015
Mittenwald Gebirgsjäger Pentecost	Mittenwald	Kameradenkreis der Gebirgstruppe	1957-
EDL rally	Several English cities	English Defence League	2009-2014
Pressefest der Deutsche Stimme	Several towns in eastern Germany	NPD	2001-2012
Red, White and Blue festival	Denby and elsewhere in central England	British National Party	1999-2009
REP Aschermittwochsveranstaltung	Geisenhausen	Die Republikaner	1998-2005
Mourn Lee Rigby	Various locations in England	English Defence League	2013-2013
Sachsentag (Sommerfest)	Locations in Sachsen	Junge Nationaldemokraten	2007-2013
Tag der deutschen Zukunft	Several German cities	NPD, Die Rechte, III Weg	2009-2019
Trauermarsch Dresden	Dresden	Junge Landsmannschaft Ostdeutschland, NPD; Aktionsbündnis gegen das Vergessen (AgdV)	2000-2013
Ulrichsberg-Gedenkfeier	Klagenfurt	Ulrichsberggemeinschaft	1958-2017
1. Waffen-SS commemoration	Halbe	coalition of far-right groups, led by far-right activist Christian Worch	1990-1992
2. Waffen-SS commemoration	Halbe	Christian Worch's Die Rechte, NPD	2002-2007
Wien Akademiker Ball	Wien	Wien FPÖ	2013-
Wiener Korporations Ball	Wien	Wiener Korporations-Ring	1952-2012
Freital steht auf	Freital	Bürgerinitiative Freital wehrt sich - Nein zum Hotelheim	2015-2015
Heidenau hört zu	Heidenau	Bürgerinitiative Heidenau hört zu, NPD	2015-2015
Einsiedel sagt Nein zur EAE	Chemnitz	Bürgerinitiative Einsiedel	2015-2016

NOTES

[1] Davenport (2015: 39) approaches this in his explanation of "intersection of internal and external sources of demobilization," in which pairs of causal conditions, one internal and one external, combine to produce demobilization. However, demobilizing pressures can and often do occur in more complex configurations, multiple internal and external factors figuring in the process. It is the work of within-case study to disentangle these conditions and identify causal mechanisms.

[2] Davenport's (2015) theorization of social movement organization demobilization is more successful—though still problematic in some parts—because a focus on organizations establishes a less variable unit of analysis. Campaigns are not like this; they are protean, adopting any number of forms.

[3] Casquete (2006: 47) provides a good definition: "a collective gathering in a public space whose aim is to exert political, social, and/or cultural influence on authorities, public opinion and participants through the [...] expression of an opinion or demand." I exclude "disciplined and peaceful" from Casquete's definition because these are not essential to the definition of demonstrations—there are plenty of undisciplined and/or nonpeaceful demonstrations.

[4] The study specifies England rather than the United Kingdom or Britain so as not to include cases from Northern Ireland, a unique context with singular dynamics, or contexts in which there are no cases of large far-right demonstration campaigns (i.e., Scotland and Wales).

[5] As noted below, the classification of eastern Germany as representing weak parties and strong movements is appropriate before 2015. In the years since, the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland Party has transformed the socio-political landscape; far-right movements remain strong in eastern Germany—but there is now a strong far-right party, with significant connections to this movement scene.

[6] Some research (e.g., Koopmans and Rucht 1995) suggests that far-right mobilization would subside after such encouraging electoral results. Indeed, such a development may have begun with the 2019 election of Boris Johnson in the U.K. (Parveen 2020).

[7] Protest-event datasets have been criticized on several grounds. See Demarest and Langer (2019) for potential pitfalls—not least of which is selection bias. This problem typically stems from sole reliance on one or a few national newspapers for data. The present study avoids this issue by applying the "blanketing strategy" described below.

[8] Attending to the consistency of topical focus ensures that demonstration events represent a series of strategically linked actions (and could thus be grouped as part of one campaign), rather than merely being the coincident initiative of the same far-right organizer; for social movement actors can operate multiple campaigns simultaneously.

[9] The study excludes the case of the so-called Bleiburg Commemorations that take place annually in southern Austria. While it is a large, far-right (at least partially) demonstration campaign, with the recurrent sponsorship of the Croatian state and the Catholic Church the Bleiburg Commemorations are an archetypal unique case, characterized by singular dynamics and processes.

[10] Analyses were conducted with the QCA (Dusa 2019) and SetMethods (Oană and Schneider 2018) packages for R.

[11] See Koopmans's (1997) conception of "institutional repression."

[12] See Koopmans's (1997) conception of "situational repression."

[13] In some cases, private channeling is linked to states—sometimes covertly sponsored by them (e.g., astroturfing).

[14] These are called logical remainders. See Schneider and Wagemann (2012) on logical remainders and limited diversity.

[15] An intermediate sufficiency solution—unlike parsimonious and conservative solutions—is based on simplifying assumptions that are easy counterfactuals, that is, they accord with specified directional expectations. For further explanation, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012).

[16] Here, coverage refers to the relation in size of the solution term and the outcome set. In other words, coverage "expresses how much of the outcome is covered" by the solution term (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 325).

[17] Here, consistency measures the degree to which one solution term is a subset of the outcome.

[18] This case is not listed in table 4 because it is only a partial member of the outcome set. Nevertheless, it still represents the outcome of negative demobilization (due to lost participation). See figure 4.

[19] That is, "Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In other words, INUS conditions are individual representations of conditions within the terms that comprise a solution. For example, the solution derived in this study is $SCH * LD + SCO * LD + PCH * LD + SCO * PCO * LD => ND$. In that solution SCH is an INUS condition of the first term; LD is the other INUS condition comprising that term.

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